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- 1. MEETING WITH OCTOBER PRODUCED FOLLOWING NEW INFO:
- OF GENERAL VIAUX DID NOT PROVIDE THEIR NAMES) WHO REQUESTED ARMS WITH WHICH TO START UPRISING. TURNED DOWN PROPOSAL CATEGORICALLY, BECAUSE OF HIS CONVICTION THAT ANY MOVE WHICH PREDICATED ON IS BOUND TO FAIL.
- B. IF SIMILAR REQUEST WERE TO BE RECEIVED FROM ACTIVE DUTY
 GENERALS, WOULD ALSO TURN THAT DOWN BECAUSE OF
 RELUCTANCE TO ASSUME BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY

 SPECIFICALLY WOULD NOT PROVIDE ARMS IF
 THE GCLPE WERE TO BE MADE CONTINGENT ON A FAVORABLE
 REACTION. INSISTS THAT THE DECISION TO MOVE MUST BE A
 DECISION.
- C. ON OTHER HAND, IF ARMED FORCES WERE TO MAKE
 MOVE AND THEN REQUEST SUPPORT, SUCH AS ARMS, AMMUNITION AND
 OTHER LOGISTICS, WOULD PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT WITH
 ALL FACILITIES AT DISPOSAL. POSSIBILITY OF U.S. REIMBURSEMENT

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NOT AN IMPORTANT FACTOR AS ITEMS AND QUANTITIES LIKELY TO BE NEEDED READILY AVAILABLE

- D. SEES NO INDICATION THAT THERE IS NECESSARY SPIRIT OF DARING AND DETERMINATION AMONG TOP MILITARY

 LEADERSHIP. HE CONSIDERS PREOCCUPATION WITH ALLEGED NONRELIABILITY OF TROOPS, SHORTAGE OF SUPPLIES, LACK OF LEADERSHIP

 OF FREI, ETC. AS PERHAPS SUBCONSCIOUS ATTEMPT TO OBFUSCATE

 ISSUE WHICH HE SEES AS THE WILLINGNESS TO ASSUME PERSONAL RISK

 ON PART OF KEY SENIOR OFFICERS.
- 2. REVIEW OF MOST RECENT INTELLIGENCE TAKE SHOWS THAT WE HAVE MORE MATERIAL BUT THAT INFO HELD BY US BOTH SUFFICIENTLY SIMILAR TO LEAD TO VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

3. REMARKATE CABLES. AND AND INTERNAL SITUATION SEE

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